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ABSTRACT
Background and Aims Minimum unit pricing (MUP) for alcohol was introduced in Scotland on 1 May 2018, and is
nowon the policy agenda in other devolved administrations and atWestminster. Previous research has explored the argu-
ments deployed for and against MUP, but the congruence between actors in the MUP debate has not been sufﬁciently ex-
amined. This study identiﬁed and mapped the discourse coalitions that emerged in the UK MUP debate through an
analysis of actors’ use of arguments in media coverage of the policy debates. Design A sample of print media coverage
of MUPwas obtained from the LexisNexis newspaper database. The resulting sample was imported into discourse network
analysis (DNA) software for coding and subsequent visualization of actor networks. Setting United Kingdom.
Observations A total of 348 articles from eight UK-wide and three Scottish newspapers from an 18-month period, end-
ing in November 2012, were analysed.Measurements Actors’ arguments were coded to generate structured data for
conversion into a weighted actor network where ties represent similarities among actors in terms of arguments in support
of or opposition toMUP. Findings Two polarized discourse coalitions, Opponents and Proponents of MUP, emerged inme-
dia coverage. The Proponents coalition consisted mainly of health advocacy groups, charities, political parties and aca-
demic institutions. In the Opponents coalition, the networks were formed of key alcohol manufacturers and economic
think-tanks. While producer organizations were central to the Opponents coalition, some commercial actors were more
favourable to MUP, highlighting divisions within the industry overall. Conclusions Media coverage of minimum unit
pricing (MUP) in Scotland from June 2011 to November 2012 showed alignment between the policy positions of (1) alco-
hol producers and think-tanks opposed toMUP; and (2) public health advocates and health charities in favour of the policy.
Some alcohol industry actors were supportive of MUP indicating divisions among the industry. Discourse network analysis
may be usefully applied to study other highly contested policy issues in health and beyond.
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INTRODUCTION
Forms of minimum alcohol pricing have been in place
throughout various Scandinavian countries and Canadian
provinces for several years, offering governments an oppor-
tunity to both raise revenue and stabilize markets [1]. The
implementation of similar policies, with the explicit aim of
reducing consumption and minimizing health harms, has
been widely debated since the Scottish Government an-
nounced its interest inMinimumUnit Pricing (MUP) for al-
cohol. Attracting international interest, the policy is now
under consideration among various international con-
texts, including Ireland, Estonia [2] and Australia [3], as
well as elsewhere in the United Kingdom. In these contexts,
and throughout the United Kingdom, the impact of MUP is
heavily anticipated. Following the UK Supreme Court
ruling in November 2017 against the Scotch Whisky
Association’s challenge to the policy, MUP was introduced
in Scotland on 1 May 2018 [4]. This internationally
signiﬁcant policy passed into law in Scotland in June
2012 (the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act).
At Westminster, the extension of the policy to England
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was shelved in 2013, with the Conservative–Liberal
Democrat coalition government citing a lack of evidence;
it remains under review [5]. In Wales, the Public Health
(Minimum Price for Alcohol) (Wales) Bill was introduced
to the National Assembly in October 2017 and inNorthern
Ireland the Department of Health have announced a con-
sultation paper on MUP for consideration in 2018 [6].
The progress of MUP has been highlighted as an illustra-
tion of the complexity of the policy process [7], with a
range of factors determining the status and traction of
the policy across political contexts [8,9].
Complex policy processes can be conceptualized as net-
works of political ‘actors’ or stakeholders with an interest
in the formation of a particular policy, that form coalitions
in order to shape and inﬂuence policy debates [10,11]. The
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) posits that actors
with similar normative policy beliefs can be identiﬁed and
that these entrenched coalitions compete about policy de-
sign over long time-periods [12]. Argumentative discourse
analysis suggests that actors inﬂuence each other through
arguments and position themselves at ‘particular sites of
discursive production’, which are referred to as ‘discourse
coalitions’ [13]. Exploring the discourses produced in a
policy debate, the networks of actors that coalesce around
particular assemblages of beliefs, and the discourse
coalitions that emerge from debates, provides insights into
the complex process of policy development.
In relation to MUP, a broad range of actors have been
identiﬁed as stakeholders in the policy debate. Previous
work on media representations of MUP highlights the role
of advocates (public health groups, health charities and ac-
ademics) in making supportive statements about the policy
in media coverage of the debate [14]. Support for MUPwas
also evident among wider policy stakeholders, including
the police and National Health Service (NHS) [15].
Previous research on alcohol policy in general, and MUP
in particular, has also highlighted the importance of the
alcohol industry as key inﬂuencers [16–19]. Direct mecha-
nisms of industry inﬂuence include responses to consulta-
tions, lobbying activities, widespread media presence and
legal challenges [16,19]. More indirect inﬂuence by
industry through organizations such as think-tanks [18]
and charities [17], as well as through alliances with
consumer/civil society groups and engagement in social
responsibility activities [19], has also been noted.
Currently, a nuanced picture of the congruence be-
tween actors in the MUP debate is lacking. No studies have
provided visual representations which reﬂect the polariza-
tion and conﬁguration of actors and organizations involved
in the debate. Consequently, the present paper seeks to
identify the discourse coalitions active in the alcohol policy
debate through actors’ use of arguments in print media
coverage of MUP using the method of discourse network
analysis [11,20]. By exploring in detail explicit agreement
and disagreement between organizations involved in alco-
hol policy development such analyses can provide opportu-
nities for triangulation of existing evidence on policy
inﬂuences, offer new insights on the impact of relationships
between actors on stated policy positions and help to iden-
tify sites for targeted public health advocacy.
METHODS
Design
The Discourse Network Analysis (DNA) method, which
combines qualitative content analysis with network
analysis to facilitate the study of policy debates [11,20],
was applied to UK newspaper coverage of the development
of MUP during a period of intense debate.
Data
Eight UK-wide and three Scottish newspapers (and Sunday
counterparts) were searched during a 19-month period,
ending in November 2012, for mentions of Alcohol* OR
Booze OR Liquor OR Hooch [in the headline] AND Price
OR Pricing or Tax OR Levy [anywhere in text] using the
LexisNexis database. The publications were selected to rep-
resent three genres of newspaper: ‘serious’/broadsheet,
mid-market and tabloid; and a range of readership proﬁles
in relation to age, social class and political alignment, as in
previous studies [21]. A full list of publications is available
in the Supporting information, Data S1. The search period
commenced on1May2011, before the formation of a Scot-
tish National Party (SNP) majority Scottish Government in
the Scottish elections held on 5 May 2011 and ended 30
November 2012, after the announcement of the UK
Government’s consultation on their alcohol strategy. The
period covered was selected to include a peak in reporting
on the policy identiﬁed by Patterson and colleagues [22].
The search identiﬁed 937 articles. All articles were read to
determine whether they met the pre-deﬁned inclusion
criteria: MUP was the main focus of the articles, and the
article was a news, commentary or feature piece (readers’
letters were excluded). After exclusions, 348 articles were
included.
Measures
Using Discourse Network Analyzer (DNA),1 extracts of
newspaper text which featured actors’ arguments on alco-
hol consumption and MUP were coded as ‘statements’.
Each statement was coded for four variables: individual
actor’s name, organizational association of the actor, the
argument referred to by the actor (henceforth called
1Available at: https://github.com/leifeld/dna (accessed September 2018) (Archived at http://www.webcitation.org/74jTxwMZz on 17 December 2018).
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‘concept’) and a dummy variable for agreement or dis-
agreement by the actor with the concept. This approach
follows that developed by Leifeld [20]. As only direct quotes
and reported speech from actors in the debate are coded,
journalistic/editorial comment is not included in the anal-
ysis. In total, 1924 statements made by 152 individuals
from 94 organizations, relating to 56 concepts, were coded.
Following initial coding, a 10% sample of articles was
coded blind, inconsistencies in coding were discussed and
resolved and reﬁnements made to some concepts. All
articles were recoded applying this ﬁnal coding framework.
A table of actors and actor types and list of concepts are
provided in the Supporting information, Data S2 and S3.
Data analysis
DNA was used to convert the structured data into a
weighted actor × actor network, where ties and their
weights represent similarities among actors in terms of
agreement and disagreement over concepts. The tie
weight between any two actors was calculated as the
number of different concepts they jointly supported or
jointly rejected over the course of the 18-month period,
minus the number of concepts on which the actors had di-
verging opinions, divided by the average number of state-
ments made by both. This is a ‘subtract’ transformation
with ‘average activity normalization’ [20]. This deﬁnition
of tie weights measures argumentative similarity in excess
of differences of opinion and ensures that only argumenta-
tive similarity, but not the rate at which actors issue state-
ments, is considered for the calculation of tie weights.
Negative tie weights represent differences in opinion in ex-
cess of argumentative similarity, while positive tie weights
represent similar argumentative positions in excess of dif-
ferences in opinion, aggregated over all concepts and the
whole time-period. A threshold value of ≥ 0.4 was deter-
mined in an exploratory way and applied to the resulting
network to retain only relatively robust argumentative
similarity as ties in the network [20].
The actor network was then imported into the network
visualization software visone to map actors and their coali-
tions visually.2 Actors in the network are represented as
nodes and ties (calculated as above) and are represented
by linear connections between nodes. Girvan–Newman
edge-betweenness community detection—a common
graph clustering algorithm (see [23])—was applied to the
network in order to identify discourse coalitions as cohesive
subgroups with similar argumentative patterns. The dis-
course coalitions were highlighted in the network visuali-
zations as blue hyperplanes. Different actor types were
highlighted using colours, and the statement frequency of
each actor was visualized as the size of the respective node.
In order to check for bias inherent in publications cho-
sen, separate networks were created for each individual
newspaper. Broadly, these showed polarized coalitions in
line with the complete network (although smaller and
hence with less certainty). These networks are available
in the Supporting information, Data S4.
Finally, three half-year time slices of the network were
created to track changes in the policy debate over time.
For each time slice, bar plots were created for the concepts
to indicate how common and how contested each
argument was in each phase of the debate.
FINDINGS
A range of types of actors were represented in media
coverage of the debate. The organizational associations of
individual actors included political parties, charities, advo-
cacy groups, professional associations, think-tanks, alcohol
manufacturers, retailers and retail associations and
licensed traders. All the types of organizations are repre-
sented in the main component of the network.
Proponents and opponents
Two discourse coalitions are evident in the MUP network.
Figure 1 shows the coalition of proponents of MUP on the
right-hand side of the network diagram and the coalition
of opponents of MUP on the left-hand side. These discourse
coalitions represent similarities among actors in terms of
co-support or co-rejection of concepts related to MUP.
The ‘Proponents of MUP’ coalition (henceforth referred
to as Proponents) includes health charities and advocacy
groups, ﬁve UK and Scottish government and opposition
political parties, some alcohol manufacturers, some
licensed trade representatives and most academic institu-
tions (see right side of Fig. 1). Central organizations within
this coalition include the SNP and several professional
associations (Royal College of Physicians, Royal College of
Nursing and British Medical Association). These organiza-
tions are drawn together by agreement on a range of
concept statements relating to alcohol problem deﬁnition,
drivers of alcohol harms and MUP as a potential solution;
see Table 1 for examples.
The ‘Opponents of MUP’ coalition (henceforth referred
to as Opponents) consists of some alcohol industry manu-
facturers, most large supermarkets, alcohol trade organiza-
tions, economic think-tanks, some academic institutions
and both Scottish and UK Labour (opposition) parties (see
left side of Fig. 1). Central organizations within this dis-
course coalition include the Scotch Whisky Association
and the Wine and Spirit Trade Association. These organi-
zations are drawn together by agreement on conceptions
of the alcohol problem, ideological opposition to public
2Available at: http://www.visone.info/ (accessed September 2018) (Archived at http://www.webcitation.org/74jTjlCmV on 17 December 2018).
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health interventions and criticism of the target population
for MUP and proposal of alternative solutions to perceived
alcohol problems; see Table 2 for examples.
Network and coalition development
The dynamic nature of policy coalitions is illustrated by
comparing Fig. 2 (covering the period from 1 May 2011
to 30 October 2011), Fig. 3 (1 November 2011 to 30 April
2012) and Fig. 4 (1 May 2012 to 30 November 2012).
Figure 2 illustrates the relatively small number of actors
engaged in the debate during the earliest phase, but indi-
cates clearly the formation of the Proponents and
Opponents coalitions. Figure 3 shows an increased number
of actors engaging in the policy debate during the second
phase, including supermarkets and government advisory
bodies. Figure 4 highlights few changes to the network
structure during the third phase, with the exception of
the UKConservatives position. They move from the Propo-
nents to the Opponents coalition. This shift is slight, as the
node retains a large number of ties across both coalitions;
however, this could be an early indication of their future
U-turn on MUP in the UK context.
Bar plots indicating the frequency of concepts referred
to, and the frequency of agreement/disagreement, during
the early, middle and later phases, show the change over
Figure 1 Discourse network for minimum unit pricing (MUP) (organizations)
Table 1 Concepts shared by Proponents.
Concept Example of statement
Government action is needed on alcohol
consumption
‘The government’s ongoing failure to tackle the root causes of alcohol misuse means we will
see hospital admissions continue to rise in the future.’ Don Shenker (Alcohol Concern),
26 May 2011, Guardian
Commercial interests should be limited to
protect public health
‘In challenging the implementation of minimum pricing, the Scotch Whisky Association is
essentially arguing that the commercial interests of its members should take precedence over
the health and wellbeing of the people of Scotland. We need to decide if our society is
prepared to limit commercial activity to better protect our health and quality of life, or
alternatively, allow powerful corporate interests to dictate health policy.’ Evelyn Gillan
(Alcohol Focus Scotland) 26 October 2012, Guardian
MUP needed to reduce health harms/
deaths related to alcohol
‘Minimum pricing will reduce the harm caused by alcohol misuse and we believe the policy,
agreed by Parliament and backed by expert opinion, is themost effective pricingmeasure and
it will save lives.’ Alex Neil (SNP), 29 December 2012, Daily Record
MUP = minimum unit pricing.
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time in the prominence of speciﬁc concepts inﬂuencing the
network.
Figure 5 shows that between May and October 2011
the most frequently mentioned concept is around the
necessity of MUP to address the alcohol problem, an argu-
ment made most often by Proponents. The second most
popular concept is ‘MUP is illegal’, an argument which
draws together the Opponents coalition. The concept
whichmost divided opinion (equivalent levels of agreement
and disagreement) is the potential forMUP to reduce heavy
drinking, reﬂecting the focus on the efﬁcacy of the policy as
a targeted population measure. By the middle phase
(Fig. 6), this concept remained a focus of contention. Two
further polarizing concepts, that responsibility deals with
industry are ineffective (23 disagree, 22 agree) and that
MUP is supported by evidence MUP (17 disagree, 13 agree)
Table 2 Concepts shared by Opponents.
Concept Instance
Alcohol-related harm is falling/stabilizing ‘It is surprising that hospital admissions have apparently doubled over a period in which
alcohol consumption has signiﬁcantly declined. If the hospital admissions data are
robust, they clearly put paid to the argument that measures to reduce overall alcohol
consumption are effective in reducing harm.’ David Poley (Portman Group), 27 May
2011, Daily Mail
Government action on public health is
unnecessary
‘It’s regressive and paternalistic, treating people as if they’re children to be nannied by
the Government.’ Sam Bowman (Adam Smith Institute), Independent.co.uk, 14 May
2012
MUP is an unfair cost to consumer and will
penalize responsible drinkers
‘It [MUP] is more likely to have a bigger proportionate impact on responsible drinkers
who happen to be in low-income households.’ Andrew Lansley (Health Secretary,
Conservative), 18 December 2011, Independent
Responsibility deals with industry are effective ‘We have also had signiﬁcant success with community alcohol partnerships aimed at
combating under-age drinking; the Responsibility Deal is taking a billion units of alcohol
out of the market.’ Gavin Partington (Wine and Spirit Trade Association), 30 March
2012, The Times.
MUP = minimum unit pricing.
Figure 2 Discourse network for minimum unit pricing (MUP) (organizations): 1 May 2011–30 October 2011
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are also evident. By the later phase (Fig. 7), legality and
efﬁcacy were the top divisive concepts.
Despite a slight shift in organizational positions within
the network, insights from the argumentation of the
debate suggest that the key issues during the period
remained relatively consistent, with increased division
based on perspectives on responsibility deals and the evi-
dence base for MUP evident in the middle phase.
Figure 3 Discourse network for minimum unit pricing (MUP) (organizations): 1 November 2011–30 April 2012
Figure 4 Discourse network for minimum unit pricing (MUP) (organizations): 1 May 2012–30 November 2012
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Political parties and coalition centrality
Figure 1 shows the centrality of political parties as key
nodes linking the Opponents and Proponents coalitions.
Table 3 provides a count of each political party’s total ties
in the network, the number of these ties that exist within
their primary cluster and a resultant measure that cap-
tures the ratio of cluster–external ties over all ties of a given
actor (‘external ratio’).
The higher the external ratio score, the less central and
embedded the party is within its respective coalition. As il-
lustrated in Fig. 1, the Conservatives, Labour and Scottish
Conservatives nodes operate across the coalitions, with
links to both Proponents and Opponents, making their
scores relatively high. In contrast, the SNP score of 0.00 re-
ﬂects the centrality of the party within the Proponents co-
alition, with no links to organizations outside the coalition.
Scottish Labour also has a low score, as it is embedded
within the Opponents coalition. The Liberal Democrats
and Scottish Liberal Democrats have low external ratio
scores, indicating their embeddedness within the Propo-
nents coalition. None of the political parties inhabit posi-
tions at the outer edges of the network or their respective
coalitions; rather they are either central to the network
or to a particular coalition. The high external ratio score
of the UKConservative Party reﬂects the number of individ-
ual politicianswho voiced opposing perspectives onMUP in
the media during the course of the debate. This can be
further explored through visualization of the network at
individual actor, rather than organizational, level.
Figure 8 shows the opposing positions taken up by
prominent Conservative UK Government politicians in
the debate on MUP. David Cameron (Prime Minister),
TheresaMay (Home Ofﬁce) and Jeremy Hunt (Culture, Me-
dia and Sport, thenHealth) are all central actors in the Pro-
ponents coalition. Andrew Lansley (Health), Michael Gove
Figure 5 Frequency of reference to concepts: 1 May 2011–30 October 2011
Mapping discourse coalitions in the debate on MUP 747
© 2018 The Authors. Addiction published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Society for the Study of Addiction. Addiction, 114, 741–753
(Education) and David Willets (Universities) are central to
the Opponents coalition. Liberal Democrat politicians are
also split across the coalitions; however, the two Scottish
Liberal Democrats in the network (Willie Rennie—Leader,
and Alison McInnes—Health spokesperson) are both in
the Proponents coalition. Labour politicians are also split,
with two in the Opponents coalition, and several in the
Proponents coalition (including the leader—Ed Miliband).
The majority of Scottish Labour politicians are in the Oppo-
nents coalition, reﬂecting their position in opposition to the
SNP in the Scottish Parliament. SNP politicians in Fig. 2
are all situated in the Proponents coalition.
Commercial organizations
Figure 1 illustrates both cooperation and divergence
among industry organizations involved in the MUP debate.
Prominent central nodes in the Opponents coalition are
the Wine and Spirit Trade Association and the Scotch
Whisky Association appearing largest, because they were
most active in the coalition. The size and position of these
nodes suggest their leadership within the Opponents.
Among alcohol producers, Tennant’s is the sole manufac-
turer to be positioned within the Proponents coalition,
with SAB Miller, Diageo and Heineken centrally positioned
within the Opponents coalition. Tennant’s, however, like
Carlsberg UK, is very much on the periphery of the net-
work, having made few statements in agreement with
other organizations. The Licensed Trade organizations are
also dispersed between the coalitions, with the Scottish Li-
censed Trade Association and Greene King positioned
within the Proponents coalition and JD Wetherspoon
within the Opponents coalition. Retailers are also dis-
persed, with Tesco positioned on the periphery of the
Figure 6 Frequency of reference to concepts: 1 November 2011–30 April 2012
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Proponents coalition and Sainsbury’s, Asda and Morrisons
within the Opponents, alongside the British Retailers Con-
sortium and Scottish Grocers Federation. This dispersal
suggests a lack of co-agreement or co-disagreement among
commercial organizations in their statements on MUP.
Think-tanks and charity organizations
The majority of the charities included in the network, e.g.
Alcohol Concern, Alcohol Focus Scotland, are positioned
centrally in the Proponents coalition with no ties to orga-
nizations in the Opponents Coalition. A charity which
has previously received alcohol funding, Addaction [17],
is also situated in the Proponents coalition, although
more peripherally. Drinkaware, which is 96% funded by
major UK alcohol producers, pub operators, restaurants,
major supermarkets and other retailers [24], is also situ-
ated in the Proponents coalition. However, most of its ties
are to commercial organizations, albeit those which are
supportive of, or ambivalent about, the idea of MUP.
Figure 7 Frequency of reference to concepts: 1 May 2012–30 November 2012
Table 3 Political party ties.
Party
Total
ties
Ties within
cluster
External
ratio
Conservatives 33 20 0.39
Labour 24 17 0.29
Liberal Democrats 19 18 0.05
Scottish National Party 24 24 0.00
Scottish Labour 19 18 0.05
Scottish Conservatives 24 13 0.46
Scottish Liberal
Democrats
19 18 0.05
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Certain think-tanks (i.e. Adam Smith Institute, Centre for
Economics and Business Research and Institute for
Economic Affairs) are located in the Opponents coalition
along with alcohol manufacturers and retail associations,
suggesting consistent alignment of the positions articu-
lated by these groups on key concepts used by opponents
of MUP.
Academic organizations
Most academic organizations in the network feature in the
Proponents coalition, including the two largest academic
contributors to the debate, the University of Shefﬁeld and
Newcastle University, closely aligned with advocacy
groups, alcohol-related health charities and the SNP. Two
universities are positioned peripherally to the network or
within the Opponents coalition, Glasgow Caledonian
University and Birmingham University, respectively. In
both cases this reﬂects academic actors with an interest
in Public Health, offering critical perspectives on MUP; for
example, highlighting potential unintended consequences
for alcohol-dependent individuals, such as increased
drug-taking or criminal activities (Glasgow Caledonian
University, 13 December 2011, The Times). In addition, in-
dividual academics from Glasgow Caledonian University
with expertise in Business Studies and Philosophy
commented on the policy from disciplinary perspectives
outside of Public Health, in one instance citing application
of JS Mill’s harm principle as a litmus test for the appropri-
ateness of laws governing individuals’ behaviour (Glasgow
Caledonian University, 3 December 2011, The Sunday
Times). Expression of such perspectives creates alignment
with evidence producers in economic think-tanks, rather
than Public Health academic colleagues.
European actors
A tightly linked portion of the Opponents coalition contains
those European actors whose contributions to the debate
were focused on the legality of MUP. Several wine-
producing nations who entered objections, the European
Union (EU) commission, the Law Society and the European
Spirits Organization, as well as the Scottish Labour Party,
are drawn together by general agreement that the policy
was illegal or questionable.
DISCUSSION
In accordance with previous research on media represen-
tations of MUP, which suggests that stakeholders were rep-
resented as either advocates or critics of the policy [14], our
study shows that two polarized discourse coalitions
emerged during the course of the debate drawn together
by co-agreement and co-disagreement over conceptualiza-
tions of the alcohol problem, and responses to MUPas a po-
tential solution. By offering a visual representation of the
network of UK stakeholders engaged in the MUP debate,
our study illustrates how actors cluster according to stated
preferences about the policy, and provides key insights into
Figure 8 Discourse network for minimum unit pricing (MUP) (individual politicians only)
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the discursive relations of political actors, industry organi-
zations and other key stakeholders in the debate.
The political context in which MUP was conceived and
debated has been cited as an important inﬂuence on the
fate of the policy proposal. The election of an SNP adminis-
tration, which was less well acquainted with alcohol indus-
try actors, has been seen as initiating renewed Scottish
Government engagement with lobbyists from the alcohol
industry and public health on equal terms, to end a period
of relative inactivity in relation to alcohol policy [8]. Early
enthusiasm for MUP in the Scottish context has been ex-
plained by Katikireddi and colleagues as resultant from a
range of contextual inﬂuences, including desire from the
SNP Government to emulate the success of the smoke-free
legislation and follow an agenda distinct to Westminster
[7]. The devolved administration’s pursuit of MUP also
seems to have been an inﬂuential factor in the UKGovern-
ment’s period of support for the policy [8]. Political context,
however, seemed also inﬂuential in its eventual abandon-
ment. Conservative political manoeuvrings in advance of
the Scottish Independence Referendum and the 2015 Gen-
eral Election have been cited as key determinants of the
shelving of MUP at Westminster [25]. These issues of polit-
ical context resonate with the structure of the network pro-
duced in this study. While the UK Conservative Party is a
central node within the complete MUP network with links
to both the Opponents and Proponents coalitions, the SNP
node is embedded centrally within the Proponents
coalition. This difference in positioning between the two
parties in government at the time perhaps reﬂects the dif-
fering political contexts and in particular the distinctive
Scottish policy context, where channels of communication
between policymakers and health advocates have been
characterized as more open and relationships with indus-
try representatives less well established [7,8].
Often in policy networks, politicians and political
parties are positioned centrally, operating at the interface
between two opposing discourse coalitions [26,27]. In
keeping with this convention, the UK Conservative Party
node inhabits a central position in the MUP network. How-
ever, this does not reﬂect a brokering role in relation to the
development of MUP, but highlights disagreement within
the party. Mapping the development of alcohol policy in En-
gland and Wales, Nicholls & Greenaway point to both
‘ideological’ and ‘systemic’ tensions in the emergence of
MUP [28]. They cite ideological tensions within the coali-
tion government between libertarian and paternalistic per-
spectives throughout the MUP debate and identify that
support for MUP within the coalition seemed bound by
shifts in focus between departments and actors. Figure 8,
the network of politicians, illustrates these ideological
tensions and departmental shifts, with a key triad of UK
Conservatives embedded within the Opponents coalition.
Due to the relatively short nature of the time-period
studied, further shifts in position, both within the Home
Ofﬁce and from the Prime Minister, are not captured in
the current analysis.
Our analysis provides insights into the dispersal of alco-
hol manufacturers, retailers and trade associations across
both discourse coalitions. Unlike analyses of tobacco policy
networks which present starkly polarized coalitions, con-
taining clusters of homogeneous actors—either tobacco
manufacturers or health-related organizations [29]—the
MUP network shows the distribution of industry organiza-
tions across two opposing discourse coalitions, conﬁrming
previously identiﬁed divergence among alcohol-related in-
dustry actors on MUP. Holden and colleagues suggest the
alcohol industry is not a homogeneous entity and adopts
different positions on a range of policy issues, including
MUP [30]. Spirits producers, which are largely export-
focused but dependent on the off-trade for domestic sales,
were the most vehemently opposed to MUP. The Scotch
Whisky Association, identiﬁed as symbolic and strategic
leaders of the anti-legislation campaign [8], appear cen-
trally in the Opponents coalition. On-trade actors, unaf-
fected by possible prices rises and potential beneﬁciaries of
increased off-sale prices, were more sympathetic to the
policy, reﬂected in the position of the Scottish Licensed
Trade Association in the network. Other sectors (e.g. beer
producers and supermarkets), as evident in in Fig. 1, were
more divided and the positions adopted varied at company
rather than sectoral level. In all cases, those commercial
organizations opposed to MUP were more vehement in
their stance than those in favour, reﬂected in the larger size
of commercial Opponent nodes in the network.
The MUP network highlights the similarities which ex-
ist between the positions articulated by free market think-
tanks and industry actors opposed to the legislation (the
Wine and Spirit Trade Association, the Scotch Whisky As-
sociation and Diageo) at the centre of the Opponents coali-
tion. Hawkins & McCambridge have described previously
strategic funding of certain think-tank reports by alcohol
manufacturers which were heavily cited in the lead-up to
the UK Government’s 2012 alcohol strategy [18]. While
neither formal nor ﬁnancial relationships between think-
tanks and alcohol manufacturers are identiﬁed here, the
clustering evident within the Opponents network reﬂects
consistent co-agreement and co-disagreement with lead-
ing industry opponents of MUP. The network also suggests
that some of the charity organizations which have been
identiﬁed as recipients of alcohol industry funding
[17,31] were less centrally embedded within the Oppo-
nents coalition than might have been expected. Addaction
is positioned within the Proponents coalition and the
largely industry-funded Drinkaware appears in a relatively
neutral position on the periphery of the Proponents coali-
tion, although with most links to industry organizations
with a favourable, or potentially neutral, stance on MUP.
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CONCLUSION
Our analysis provides visual evidence of the network of
stakeholders engaged in the debate on the policy of MUP
to address UK alcohol consumption as portrayed in the
newsprint media. The method of DNA shows much prom-
ise for extension to further our understandings of public
health policy development. The current study draws on
media coverage as the sole source of data, and as such
the network produced reﬂects public narratives offered by
actors engaged in the debate. Triangulating the method
with other methods or with other data sources could
further increase the scope of similar studies in future. Cur-
rently, our visualizations do not highlight how the positions
of actors evolved beyond November 2012. We cannot
provide MUP network insights on the observations of other
commentators that key political events, such as prepara-
tion for the 2015 General Election or the economic
concerns of the Regulatory Policy Committee, were instru-
mental in the UK Government’s abandonment of MUP
[25]. The temporal focus also prohibits exploration of
stakeholders’ perspectives during the period of legal
challenges by the Scotch Whisky Association ending in
November 2017. Future research could employ theoreti-
cally informed time–series analysis over longer periods to
highlight how shifts in inﬂuential actors’ rhetoric, and
positions, precede or follow key announcements about
policy direction.
Illustration of co-agreement and co-disagreement be-
tween actors in favour and against MUP has conﬁrmed
existing evidence on the development of MUP policy in re-
lation to political context and provided empirical evidence
of some limitations of industry inﬂuence, particularly in re-
lation to charity organizations. The ﬁndings also suggest
sites for targeted public health advocacy, and conﬁrm the
potential of applying the method of DNA to contemporary
policy debates in order to support identiﬁcation of policy
actors and organizations with an appetite for dialoguewith
public health organizations and active engagement with
sources of public health evidence.
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